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PREDATORY PRICING STRATEGIES: THE
RELEVANCE OF INTENT UNDER
ANTITRUST, UNFAIR COMPETITION,
AND TORT LAW
Honest, unfettered competition is the foundation of any free
market economy, and the United States is no exception.' Monopo-
lization of the nation's markets2 is so antithetical to the competi-
tive system that an enterprise whose sights are set on attaining
monopoly status may be subject to harsh civil and criminal sanc-
tions under the federal antitrust laws.3
' See H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 180 (1955) (history of federal eco-
nomic policy demonstrates fundamental nature of competition to United States free market
system).
The 19th century philosopher and political economist John Stuart Mill stated that
"[c]ompetition may not be the best available stimulus but is at present a necessary one and
no one can foresee the time when it will not be indispensable to progress." 4 J. S. MLL,
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY
793 (1909). This concept has been echoed continually by American courts and commenta-
tors. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 1979) (there
is "a firm national policy that the norm for commercial activity must be robust competi-
tion"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); United Wild Rice, Inc. v. Nelson, 313 N.W.2d 628,
633 (Minn. 1982) ("[c]ompetition is favored in the law."); A.L.I. Proc. Continuation of Pres-
entation of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 196 (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1969) (statements of
Worth Rowley). "[I]n a competitive society it should be assumed that competition is a good
thing, and that a person need not be placed in the position of defending his status as a
competitor when he engages in . . .normal competitive acts." Id. "[T]he most important
type of competition is price competition." J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION: THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST POLICY 6 (1954).
2 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1007 (6th ed. 1990). A "monopoly" is defined as follows:
A form of market structure in which one or only a few firms dominate the total
sales of a product or service....
It is "monopolization" ... for persons to combine or conspire to acquire or
maintain power to exclude competitors from any part of trade or commerce, pro-
vided they also have such power that they are able, as a group, to exclude actual
or potential competition and provided that they have intent and purpose to exer-
cise that power.
Id.
' See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 12, 13, 13a (1988). The Sherman Antitrust Act, id. § 1-2, and
Clayton Act, id. § 12, as modified by the Robinson-Patman amendments, id. § 13a, confer
power on the Department of Justice (which has jurisdiction only under the Sherman Act)
and the Federal Trade Commission (which has jurisdiction under both the Sherman and
Clayton Acts) to prosecute, as felonies, conspiracies and individual attempts to monopolize,
punishable by fines up to $1 million per corporation or $100,000 per person, to sue on behalf
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Former Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis once de-
scribed predatory pricing methods as "the most potent weapon of
monopoly."" Attempted monopolization through price predation
occurs when an illegal strategy of pricing below production cost
disrupts ordinary competition so that the predator's competitor is
either forced from the market or disciplined into settling for a
smaller piece of the profit pie.5 Price-to-cost data is used as evi-
of the public seeking civil damages, and to seek equitable relief. See D. WHITMAN & J. GER-
GACZ, THE LEGAL AND SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESS 393-98 (1st ed. 1985). Class actions
and parens patriae actions may be brought by the attorney general of a state on behalf of
persons living in that state, although this is seldom done. See id. at 393-94. Section 4 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, authorizes private parties to sue violators of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts for treble pecuniary damages, and to recover reasonable attorneys' fees. D.
WHITMAN & J. GERGACZ, supra, at 393. Section 16 provides for injunctive relief. Id.
Many states also have statutes resembling antitrust laws. See, e.g, Arkansas Unfair
Practices Act, ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-201 (1987) (prohibiting monopolistic activities and
other unethical business practices); California Unfair Practices Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 17,043 (Deering Supp. 1990) (unlawful to sell product below cost for purpose of injuring
competitors or destroying competition); Colorado Unfair Practices Act, CoLo. REV. STAT.
ANN. §6-2-101 (1989) (same); Minnesota Act Against Unfair Discrimination and Competi-
tion, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.04 (West Supp. 1990) (selling below production cost forbid-
den); Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act, 15 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 598.3 (West 1989) (prohibit-
ing sales below cost in certain situations); Tennessee Unfair Sales Law, TENN. CODE ANN. §
47-25-203 (1988) (same); Utah Unfair Practices Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-5-17 (1986) (leg-
islative policy against unethical business activity); West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices
Act, W. VA. CODE § 47-11A-1 (Supp. 1989) (same).
4 L. BRANDEIS, COMPETITION THAT KILLS IN BUSINESS-A PROFESSION 236, 254 (1914);
see Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND
PRICE POLICY 331, 334-35 (National Bureau of Economic Research ed. 1955) (echoing Bran-
deis's opinion).
See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 711 (1976); Rasmussen & Wiley, Anti-
trust and Spatial Predation: A Response to Thomas J. Campbell, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1015,
1018 (1989). Predatory pricing is "conduct which has the purpose and effect of advancing
the actor's competitive position, not by improving the actor's market performance, [but] by
threatening to injure or injuring actual or potential competitors, so as to drive or keep them
out of the market, or force them to compete less effectively." L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF ANTITRUST 108 (1977). Predatory pricing has received a significant amount of atten-
tion from both academia and the judiciary. See Liebeler, Whither Predatory Pricing? From
Areeda and Turner to Matsushita, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1052, 1077-98 (1986) (collection
of articles and cases). There is no explicit justification in the language of any statute for
proclaiming that a "predatory" price is prohibited, yet it is customarily presumed that if a
firm effectuates a "predatory" act involving the price of its products it has breached either
the Sherman Act's proscription against monopolization or attempted monopolization, or the
Clayton Act's ban on price discrimination. See Carstensen, Predatory Pricing in the Courts:
Reflection on Two Decisions, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 928, 929 (1986). The gist of the com-
plaint is that the offending party sold merchandise for an amount insufficient to cover the
cost of its production, hoping to drive out or castigate rivals so that it might later market its
goods at a monopoly price. See A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d
1396, 1399 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1326 (1990); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW
185-86 (1976). See generally Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for
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dence of the defendant's intent to destroy its competition. The
defendant's documents and oral statements are also used as
"smoking guns" from which intent to monopolize may be inferred.7
Unfortunately, for both antitrust plaintiffs and defendants, there
is no consensus in the federal courts as to how proof of the defend-
ant's subjective intent to monopolize should be used, or whether
such evidence is even relevant to claims of predation.8 While the
the Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1, 5-22 (1979) (discussing predatory strat-
egies); Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REv. 869,
869-77 (1976) (same); Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87
YALE L.J. 284, 286-99 (1977) (economic and social analysis).
The history of the legal concept of "predatory pricing" can be traced to 15th century
England. See Note, Sales Below Cost Prohibitions, Private Price Fixing Under State Law,
57 YALE L.J. 391, 392 n.7 (1948) (citing School Master Case, Y.B. 11 Henry IV. 47, pl. 21
(1410)). In 1410, a teacher who was a new arrival to the English town of Gloucester opened a
children's school at which he charged less than the customary rate for instructional services.
Id. An action was brought by the schoolmaster of the Gloucester grammar school to enjoin
the new teacher from charging a below-market-rate tuition. Id. The English court found for
the defendant. Id. at 392. The court stated that the defendant, equally competent with the
plaintiff, was providing a service to the community that was "a virtuous and charitable
thing, and an ease to the people, for which he can not be punished by our law." Id.; see
Kent Stores v. Wilentz, 14 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.N.J. 1936) (setting forth text of English court's
opinion). In the United States, the earliest reported state decision concerning predatory
pricing followed the English precedent. See Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. 111, 134
(1842) (dismissing criminal indictment which had arisen as result of price cutting activities
of co-conspirators in boot-making industry). The federal rule was in accord with Hunt. See
Passaic Print Works v. Ely & Walker Dry Goods Co., 105 F. 163, 167 (8th Cir. 1900) (placing
print goods on market at "reduced cost" not actionable merely on basis of defendant's "se-
cret intent" to ruin plaintiff's business), cert. denied, 181 U.S. 617 (1901).
See, e.g., International Air Indus. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 724 (5th
Cir. 1975) (plaintiff must demonstrate either that defendant charged price below average
variable cost in competitive market or below its short-run profit-maximizing price and barri-
ers to entry great enough to enable defendant to reap benefits of predation before new entry
possible), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
7 See, e.g., McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1504-05 (11th Cir.
1988) (defendant's internal documents referring to plaintiff as "Floyd the S.O.B." and set-
ting company goal to put plaintiff out of business by year-end permitted as evidence of
intent to monopolize), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2110 (1989).
a Compare Adjusters Replace-A-Car, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 735 F.2d 884,
891-92 (5th Cir. 1984) (illustrating that predatory pricing is not established unless defend-
ant sets price below average variable cost), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985) and North-
eastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 1981) (adopting theory
that pricing falling below defendant's average variable cost is conclusively unlawful), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982) with William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental
Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1035 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that prices below average total cost
does not brand defendant's prices predatory), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982). The Wil-
liam Inglis court adopted a rebuttable presumption of predatory intent if the defendant's
prices were found to be below average total cost, including allocation for overhead. Id. at
1035. The presumption must be supplemented, however, by other evidence of objective or
subjective predatory intent if the prices are below average total cost but in excess of short
1990]
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United States Supreme Court, in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen High-
lands Skiing Corp.,9 indicated that specific intent is germane to
the issue of attempted monopolization, 0 the Court's most recent
analyses of predatory pricing, in Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp." and Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Pe-
troleum Co.,12 failed to address the issue of subjective intent, dis-
cussing predation only in the context of antitrust injury.13
run marginal cost or average variable cost. Id.
A minority of jurisdictions go so far as to declare that more important market factors
may render predatory pricing irrelevant. See, e.g., A.A. Poultry Farms, 881 F.2d at 1401
(court need only examine relation between price and cost if structure of market makes re-
coupment possible); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 235-40 (1st
Cir. 1983). Additionally, some leading commentators have expressed doubt that a "rational"
firm would ever adopt such a strategy. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 149-60 (1978);
Hovenkamp & Silver-Westrick, Predatory Pricing in the Ninth Circuit, 1983 ARIz. ST. L.J.
443, 469 n.174. This argument, however, assumes that all firms behave rationally, which is
perhaps a dubious notion. See R. POSNER, supra note 5, at 186 ("predatory pricing cannot
be dismissed as inevitably an irrational practice."). Former Judge Bork suggests that preda-
tory price cutting is "unlikely" to exist because factors such as lack of sufficient market
power and insufficient barriers to entry make a would-be predatory stratagem nothing but a
losing proposition. See R. BORK, supra. Therefore, any rule instituted to prohibit predatory
pricing would be more likely to harm consumers than the absence of any legal sanction. Id.
at 150-58. See Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
263, 270-72 (1981) (no reasonable enterprise would engage in predatory pricing, and even if
one did it would only result in windfall to consumers). "It is conceivable that predation
could be profitable .... The question, though, is whether profitable predation is probable."
Id. at 268.
472 U.S. 585 (1985).
Id. at 602. Aspen Skiing dealt with exclusionary conduct rather than predatory pric-
ing. Id. at 587-92. The Court held that "specific intent to monopolize" was necessary for
liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act, but did not indicate to what extent evidence of
subjective intent was admissible. See id. at 602-03.
:1 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
12 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990).
"3 See id. at 1892 (low prices kept above predatory levels do not effect competition and
therefore are not antitrust violations); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585 n.8 (no antitrust injury
unless defendant conspired to drive plaintiff out of relevant markets by "(i) pricing below
the level necessary to sell their products, or (ii) pricing below some appropriate measure of
cost"); see also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986) (predatory
price "below an appropriate measure of cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in
the short run and reducing competition in the long run"); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-
0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (antitrust regulations were created to protect "compe-
tition, not competitors" (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320
(1962))); Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 696 n.12, 703 (1967) ("pred-
atory intent" coupled with "unreasonably low prices" and "drastically declining price struc-
ture" may be basis of liability under § 2(a) of Clayton Act).
It is interesting to note that both sides of the predatory pricing debate have cited Car-
gill and Matsushita as supporting their conflicting positions. Compare A.A. Poultry Farms,
Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1396 (7th Cir. 1989) (contending these cases
stand for proposition that predatory pricing is illogical and such allegations are undeserving
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This Note will examine the law concerning predatory pricing
and the role subjective intent of a defendant plays in identifying
prohibited attempts to monopolize. The historical framework of
federal legislation directed at attempted monopolization and its
modern influences will be explored, leading to the conclusion that
these statutes are unsuitable vehicles in much of today's anticom-
petition-based litigation. Finally, this Note will consider the alter-
native remedies available to injured competitors when relief under
the federal antitrust statutes is inappropriate.
I. ATTEMPTED MONOPOLIZATION, PREDATORY PRICING, AND
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LEGISLATION
Responding to public remonstrance over the failure of the in-
dividual states to check adequately the formidable influence on the
nation's economy being exercised by a handful of individuals and
corporations in the latter nineteenth century. Congress moved,
through enactment of the Sherman Act a century ago,14 to regulate
monopolistic activity. 15 Section 2 of the Sherman Act declares it
unlawful to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize.., any part of
[interstate] trade or commerce."16 The legislative history of the
of merit), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1326 (1990) with McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co.,
858 F.2d 1487, 1501 (11th Cir. 1988) (asserting Cargill and Matsushita did not declare pred-
atory pricing nonexistent, only uncommon), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2110 (1989).
14 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
"5 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911); McGahee, 858 F.2d at
1497. In Standard Oil, the Supreme Court stated that the primary factor which led to the
enactment of the Sherman Act was the popular notion that the power of a small group of
influential corporations and individuals "would be exerted to oppress individuals and injure
the public generally." Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 50. Justice Harlan noted that this extreme
concentration of power raised concerns that "the country was in real danger from another
kind of slavery sought to be fastened on the American people; namely, the slavery that
would result from aggregations of capital in the hands of a few individuals and corpora-
tions." Id. at 83 (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897) (Sherman Act used to redistribute
wealth from leviathans of commerce to "small dealers and worthy men"), overruled by,
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Pitofsky, The Political Content of
Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1053-55 (1979) (reviewing historical fear of concentrated
economic power addressed by Sherman Act).
Although the debate over its wisdom was intense at the time of its passage, the Sher-
man Act has been referred to since as an economic "charter of freedom." See Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933), overruled by, Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
Is 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). More specifically, section 2 provides: "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
1990]
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Sherman Act suggests that the statute is plenary in its remedial
capabilities, drawing from common-law principles to protect the
public from economic oppression by a small group of wealthy
industrialists. 17
Subsequent federal antitrust laws focused on numerous mo-
nopolistic strategies the Sherman Act failed to deter.'" Section 2(a)
of the Clayton Act,'9 as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,20
for example, specifically addressed the regulation of unfair pricing
schemes carried out under the guise of legitimate trade.2' Today,
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... Id.
17 See 21 CONG. REc. 2456 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman). The Act was an eco-
nomic statute, but one with a political objective. See id. at 2457. Senator Sherman summa-
rized the Acts populist ideology with the following statement: "If we will not endure a king
as a political power we should not endure a king over the production, transportation, and
sale of any of the necessaries of life." Id. Senator Sherman also indicated that the Act may
have been calculated to head off a Marxist solution to economic oppression when he stated:
"You must heed [the voters'] appeal or be ready for the socialist, the communist, and the
nihilist. Society is now disturbed by forces never felt before .... These combinations al-
ready defy or control powerful transportation corporations and reach State authorities." Id.
at 2460; see also Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI.
L. REV. 221, 247-55 (1956) (synopsis of political aspects of Sherman Act). Courts and com-
mentators have observed that the Act has a dual focus, both social and economic. See
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (Sherman Act's focus was on eco-
nomic "liberty," not economics); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427
(2d Cir. 1945) (Sherman Act not motivated by economics alone); R. HOFSTADTER, WHAT
HAPPENED TO THE ANTITRUST MOVEMENT IN PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND
OTHER ESSAYS 64-65 (1985) (emphasizing political arguments for Sherman Act); H.
THORELLI, supra note 1, at 227 (Sherman Act served social purpose); Blake, Conglomerate
Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 555, 576-78 (1973) (economists had
little involvement in passing Sherman Act). But see Flynn, The Reagan Administration's
Antitrust Policy, Original Intent and the Legislative History of the Sherman Act, 33 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 259, 260 (1988) (no consensus exists as to antitrust goals).
" See R. POSNER, supra note 5, at 30-31 (loopholes in Sherman Act led to demand for
further controls on corporate power).
" 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1988).
20 Id. § 13a.
21 See id. The Act prohibits "discrimina[tion] in price between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality.., where the effect of such discrimination may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.., or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition." Id. Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act was designed expressly to deter
the strategy whereby companies attempted to acquire a monopoly in a particular market by
charging less for their merchandise than the local competition, and financing the effort
through sales at higher prices elsewhere. See FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536,
543 (1960); H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914); S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1914). The Robinson-Patman amendments reinforced the prohibition of price dis-
crimination by eliminating the "meeting competition" exception, which constituted permis-
sible grounds for price discrimination under the Clayton Act, replacing it with an exception
for price differentials attributable to "cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from
the differing methods or quantities in which [the defendant's] commodities are to [be] sold
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however, a major area of dissent among the federal circuits and
scholars is the degree of deference to be afforded the original
objectives of the federal antitrust statutes.22
II. INTENT, DANGEROUS PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS, AND THE
INFLUENCE OF THE CHICAGO SCHOOL'S ANTITRUST POLICIES
In early cases under the Sherman Act, such as Swift & Co. v.
United States," the United States Supreme Court indicated that
the defendant's intent was an important element of a cause of ac-
or delivered." 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1988). See L. KITNER & J. BAUER, 3 FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW
89-91 (1982). Rather than completely eliminate the "meeting competition" exception, the
clause was transformed into an affirmative test in section 2(b). See id. In addition, the Con-
ference Committee indicated that the "meeting competition" clause was to operate not as a
substantive defense, but only as a rule of evidence. Id.; see also Henry v. Chloride, Inc., 809
F.2d 1334, 1339 (8th Cir. 1987). "The evil addressed in the Sherman Act was the big trust,
which could swallow up or drive out smaller businesses and charge monopoly prices. The
villain of Robinson-Patman was the big chain store, which could command low prices from
manufacturers, thereby undercutting smaller enterprises and bypassing wholesale distribu-
tors." Id.; S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936) (detailing need for modification).
The Robinson-Patman Act has been criticized severely. See Elman, The Robinson-Pat-
man Act and Antitrust Policy: A Time for Reappraisal, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 579, 580-88
(1986). The criticism is two-fold: (1) the Act tends to fix prices, and (2) by emphasizing
uniformity, the Act has required the kind of price rigidity the Sherman Act condemned. See
id. In addition, critics assert that prohibitions on price discrimination cause distortions in
price decisions. Id. Price discrimination laws were passed in response to two threats: the
power of a rational seller to use territorial price discrimination to destroy local competition,
and large buyers doing the same. Id. The Justice Department concluded, however, that ter-
ritorial price discrimination rarely occurs because of the expense involved. Id.
22 See Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1696, 1702 (1986).
Judge Easterbrook, one of the most prominent members of the Chicago School and a self-
professed antitrust skeptic, has argued that in passing the Sherman Act, Congress issued a
"blank check" to the judiciary to pen in whatever remedy it deemed most appropriate. Id.;
see United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), afl'd, 326 U.S. 1
(1945); E. KINTER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 12 (Supp. 1989) (application of "rule of reason"
gave undue power to judges). Judge Easterbrook recently endorsed such a "blank check" in
A.A. Poultry Farms Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1326 (1990); cf. Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d
1409, 1413-16 (7th Cir. 1989) (demonstrating judicial deference to market forces in general
rather than interest in protecting individual businesses). But see Hovenkamp, Antitrust
Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 213, 249-55 (1985) (protesting forsaking of legislative
history of antitrust laws advocated by Chicago School).
Aside from the controversy over the deference to be afforded the original goals of the
Sherman Act, there is considerable debate over what these original goals in fact were. Com-
pare Lande, Wealth Transfers Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 93-96 (1983) (goal of anti-
trust laws was to protect consumers from unfair transfers of wealth) with Bork, Legislative
Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 passim (1966) (Congress only
intended to deal with "common welfare" by ensuring legitimate competition).
23 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
1990]
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tion for attempted monopolization.24 Later, in Utah Pie Co. v.
Continental Baking Co.,2 5 the Court permitted the use of oral and
written statements made by the defendant's employees to support
a finding, under the Robinson-Patman Act, of prohibited intent to
monopolize.28 As recently as 1985, the Court's decision in Aspen
Skiing gave some indication that specific intent remains an essen-
tial element for the imposition of liability under the Sherman
Act.2 7
Today, there is significant disagreement as to whether the de-
24 See id. at 396. Justice Holmes, in outlining the elements of the attempt to monopo-
lize offense, stated:
Intent is . .. essential to such an attempt [to monopolize] [w]here acts are not
sufficient in themselves to produce a result which the law seeks to prevent,-for
instance, the monopoly,-but require further acts in addition to the mere forces of
nature to bring that result to pass, an intent to bring it to pass is necessary in
order to produce a dangerous probability that it will happen. But when that intent
and the consequent dangerous probability exist, [the Sherman Act], like many
others and like the common law in some cases, directs itself against that danger-
ous probability as well as against the completed result.
Id. (citation omitted).
Soon after Swift, a "rule of reason" was adopted, apparently for all litigation under the
Sherman Act, giving judges wide latitude when measuring the monopolistic and efficiency
effects of practices in each case. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. .United States, 246 U.S. 231,
238 (1918); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-67 (1911). Generally, the ele-
ments of an attempt to monopolize offense under section 2 of the Sherman Act are said to
be "(1) Specific intent to control prices or destroy competition in a relevant market[;] (2)
Predatory or anticompetitive conduct directed to accomplishing the unlawful purpose[;] (3)
A dangerous probability of success[; and] (4) Antitrust injury." Liebeler, supra note 5, at
1056; see C.A.T. Indus. Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris. Indus., 884 F.2d 209, 210 (5th Cir.
1989) (discussing elements to be proven for successful action under Clayton Act); Conoco,
Inc. v. Inman Oil Co., Inc., 774 F.2d 895, 904 n.6 (8th Cir. 1985) (collecting cases supporting
three-element approach to liability for attempted monopolization); United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 431-32 (2d Cir. 1945) (specific intent needed for attempted
monopolization); VAHERICS, ANTITRUST BASICS § 5.03 (1989) (attempt to monopolize requires
three elements of proof: specific intent to monopolize; conduct by defendant that is an-
ticompetitive or predatory in nature; and "dangerous probability" that defendant will suc-
ceed in monopolizing market).
25 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
" See id. at 696-97. The Court stated that in determining whether the defendant's dis-
criminatory pricing scheme was aimed at injuring the plaintiff, the jury could rely on state-
ments made by the defendant's management that the plaintiff was "an unfavorable factor"
who "d[u]g holes in [the defendant's competing] operation." Id.
The Utah Pie decision has been criticized sharply as effectively stifling price competi-
tion in oligopolistic markets. See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: FEDERAL
REGULATION OF PRICE DIFFERENCES 12-15, 38 (1976); Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the
Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70, 70-73 (1967). The Department of
Justice has expressed doubt about the value of the Robinson-Patman Act in its entirety. See
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AT 12-27 (1977).
2 See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 602-03; see also supra note 10 (discussion of case).
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fendant's intent is still relevant in the context of federal antitrust
litigation.28 The problem centers on the difficulty of distinguishing
between intent that is merely symptomatic of aggressive competi-
tion, for which a firm should be lauded, and intent indicative of a
desire to monopolize a particular market, for which a firm should
be disciplined.2 9 Examining a corporate defendant's pricing prac-
tices was determined to be a particularly difficult method by which
to prove an antitrust violation.3
In 1975, Harvard Professors Philip Areeda and Donald Turner
attempted to resolve this dilemma by describing an objective test
for illegal predation."1 Under the Areeda-Turner analysis, evidence
demonstrating that the defendant priced its merchandise below a
calculable level cost of production supported a finding of an imper-
28 The conflict that has developed in the circuits focuses on how the defendant's intent
is to be weighed in light of the probable chances of monopolization. Compare A.A. Poultry
Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farm, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1989) (specific intent
immaterial), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1326 (1990), and Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell
Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983) (subjective intent irrelevant to liability under Sher-
man Act) with Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 602 (anticompetitive intent of dominant firm rele-
vant to attempted monopolization claim) and Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953) (analogous to law of criminal attempt, requirement of spe-
cific intent in attempted monopolization claim confines reach to conduct threatening mo-
nopolization) and McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1496 (11th Cir.
1988) (evidence of subjective intent admissible), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2110 (1989), and
William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1027-28
(9th Cir. 1981) (assuming that bad intent itself is unlawful and using price-cost data to infer
it), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
Both sides of the debate cited the Supreme Court's decision in Matsushita as standing
for the proposition that subjective intent plays either no part in an attempt to monopolize a
claim under the Sherman Act, or an important part of such a claim, respectively. See supra
note 13 (discussion of use of Matsushita decision by both camps).
2 See A.A. Poultry Farms, 881 F.2d at 1402 ("desire to extinguish one's rivals is en-
tirely consistent with, [and] often is the motive behind, competition"); Barry Wright Corp.,
724 F.2d at 232 (savvy firm will not make "overt descriptions of a hostile plan."); see also
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1945) (company which
has achieved competitive success should not be "turned upon" merely because of such suc-
cess). But see Gifford, The Role of the Ninth Circuit in the Development of the Law of
Attempt to Monopolize, 61 NOTRE DANi L. REv. 1021, 1021-23 (1986) ("defendant's intent
resolves ... ambiguity of... defendant's present behavior by showing that it is instrumen-
tal to... forbidden goal of monopolization"). The tension between promoting open compe-
tition while penalizing "overly competitive" firms is the crux of the "antitrust paradox." R.
BORK, supra note 8.
20 See Monroe & Hill, The Predatory Pricing Controversy: Academic Theories Enter
the Courtroom, 13 U. TOL. L. REv. 539, 539 (1982). "Since the time of the Standard Oil
Trust, the notion that low pricing may be an anti-competitive practice which violates the
antitrust laws has been elusive and almost unprovable." Id.
21 See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 700-20 (1975).
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missible "intent to monopolize" under section 2 of the Sherman
Act.32 This test applied two principal rules for predatory pricing
claims: (1) a price at or above the defendant's average variable pro-
duction cost was legal, and (2) a price below the defendant's aver-
age variable production cost was illegal.33 While the courts fre-
quently cited the Areeda-Turner analysis following its publication,
many of the cases which followed the Areeda-Turner paradigm be-
came mired in the difficulty of applying these economic and ac-
counting principles to individual fact patterns. 4
A coalition of skeptical antitrust reformers, collectively known
as the "Chicago School, 315 expressed dissatisfaction with the judi-
" See id. The publication of the Areeda & Turner article had a profound effect upon
antitrust litigation. See Liebeler, supra note 5, at 1053 n.12, 1055 (59 decisions cited Areeda
& Turner between its publication in 1975 and April 1986 alone). See generally id. at 1077-94
(containing short syllabi of many of these cases).
" See Areeda & Turner, supra note 31, at 732-33 (summarizing various conclusions and
inferences to be drawn from cost-based analysis). Professors Areeda and Turner actually
called for using "short-run marginal cost," but as this was often difficult to prove, average
variable cost was suggested as an acceptable substitute. See Areeda, Predatory Pricing, 49
ANTITRUST L.J. 897, 901-02 (1980); see also Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d
1377, 1388 (9th Cir.) (prices below average total costs are presumptively illegal, but pre-
sumption can be rebutted), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983).
Evidence of below-cost pricing also is used when evaluating primary-line competitive
injury in Robinson-Patman Act cases. See Hansen, Robinson-Patman Law: A Review and
Analysis, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 1114, 1139-40 (1983); The Robinson-Patman Act: Policy and
Law, 1 ABA ANTITRUST SEC (ABA Monograph No. 4) 81-90 (1980).
" See, e.g., Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585 n.8 (recognizing conflicting uses of cost data
but deferring on issue of which standard to apply); A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre
Farm, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1400-03 (7th Cir. 1989) (difficult to choose correct cost measure),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1326 (1990); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1114-23 (7th Cir.) (various measures of cost can lead to either suppres-
sion or promotion of competition), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Chillicothe Sand &
Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427, 431-32 (7th Cir. 1980) (potential for
arbitrary results with differing price-cost relations).
Recently, the Supreme Court impliedly approved the Areeda-Turner model of preda-
tory pricing. See Atlantic-Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884, 1892 (1990).
"[I]n the context of pricing practices, only predatory pricing has the requisite anticompeti-
tive effect [for Sherman Act liability]." Id. (citing Areeda & Turner, supra note 31, at 697-
99). However, because the plaintiff conceded the defendant's prices were set "above preda-
tory levels," the Court did not have to decide which economic principles were used in deter-
mining what constituted a "predatory price." Id. at 1889.
11 See Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 1698. "[T]he Chicago School is not a 'school' so
much as it is a method of asking questions." Id. at 1699 n.7. The "Chicago School" of anti-
trust criticism originated in the late 1950's, when Professor John McGee, writing in the
Journal of Law and Economics, argued that a major antitrust precedent had confused desir-
able competition for predation. See McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil
(N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958). Other members of academia and the judiciary soon
joined in espousing the University of Chicago's economic-efficiency creed, forming a power-
1990] PREDATORY PRICING STRATEGIES
cial tendency to focus' almost exclusively on cost-based intent while
ignoring other elements in the predatory pricing blueprint.36 The
Chicago School maintained that the focus in attempted monopoli-
zation claims should not be on the defendant's subjective intent,
but rather on the requirement that the attempt have a "dangerous
probability of success. '37 Unless an attempt to monopolize was
likely to succeed, the Chicago School adherents argued, there
would be no danger of antitrust injury, and therefore, no antitrust
liability.38
The Seventh Circuit recently applied the Chicago School's
analysis in A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc."e
ful lobby for modification of federal antitrust policies. See Rasmussen & Wiley, supra note
5, at 1015-16.
11 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 264-66. Judge Easterbrook suggests that the
confusion of predatory pricing theories stems from a preoccupation with cost-based analysis.
Id. at 264.
'7 See Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409, 1413 (7th Cir.
1989); cf. Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 268 ("antitrust law should ban only those predatory
practices that reduce efficiency yet are profitable to the predators"). Whether an attempt to
monopolize has a dangerous probability of success depends on "maintaining monopoly
power for long enough both to recoup the predator's losses and to harvest some additional
gain." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589. This concept is limited by a number of factors. For
example, where barriers to entry are low, the predator faces a "no-win" situation because
once prices are raised to recoup losses accumulated while eliminating competitors, new firms
will enter the market and force prices back down. See A.A. Poultry Farms, 881 F.2d at 1403.
Market structure may also make recoupment impossible if, in an unconcentrated market,
the predator's customers can turn to other sources of supply. See id. It has been proposed
that single-firm market shares of less than 30% are insufficient to establish the requisite
market power for a successful predatory pricing campaign. See Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612-13 (1953); A.A. Poultry Farms, 881 F.2d at 1403
(collection of cases). Without assurances that a monopoly will result and can be maintained
through its efforts, "[t]he predator must make a substantial investment with no assurance
that it will pay off." Id.; see also R. BORK, supra note 8, at 145. Bork asserted the following:
Any realistic theory of predation recognizes that the predator as well as his vic-
tims will incur losses during the fighting, but such a theory supposes it may be a
rational calculation for the predator to view the losses as an investment in future
monopoly profits (where rivals are to be killed) or in future undisturbed profits
(where rivals are to be disciplined). The future flow of profits, appropriately dis-
counted, must then exceed the present size of the losses.
Id.
38 See Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization,
Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REv. 1221, 1269-78 (1989). "Anti-
trust injury is a general doctrine that limits antitrust damages to the kinds of harms that
are caused by the anticompetitive aspect of a practice." Id. at 1270. The Supreme Court has
indicated that an antitrust plaintiff's right to recover is confined to harm that is "of the type
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defend-
ants' acts unlawful." Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
-- 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1326 (1990). In A.A. Poultry
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Judge Easterbrook, one of the Chicago School's most prominent
members,40 addressed the issue of attempted monopolization under
section 2 of the Sherman Act sua sponte,41 and formulated what
may be termed the "recoupment theory" of predatory pricing.
Under this concept, where the alleged predator has no possibility
of recapturing his losses by charging monopoly prices after the
price war is over, even below-cost pricing will not be found viola-
tive of the Sherman Act's proscription against attempted monopo-
lization. 42 Despite the presence of clear evidence of the defendant's
intent to monopolize, Judge Easterbrook rejected a subjective in-
tent analysis and declared that "unless recoupment lies in store
even the most vicious intent is harmless to the competitive
system. 43
Farms, seven plaintiff companies claimed that the defendant, a vertically integrated egg
producer and processor, sold a portion of its products to their former customers at below-
cost prices in violation of the Robinson-Patman amendments to section 2(a) of the Clayton
Act. Id. at 1397.
40 See Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 1698-1702 (outlining what Judge Easterbrook
considered fundamental aspects of "Chicago School" antitrust policy).
41 See id. at 1399-1400. Although the plaintiffs brought suit under the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, Judge Easterbrook addressed the Sherman Act section 2 issue by using the stan-
dard of notice pleading. See id. Given his well-publicized views on the implausibility of
predatory pricing, it should have surprised few observers that Judge Easterbrook would take
advantage of the opportunity to put future Sherman Act claimants on notice that the Sev-
enth Circuit would be unfriendly to such assertions.
42 See A.A. Poultry Farms, 881 F.2d at 1401-02. The recoupment theory bypasses the
need for an inquiry into subjective intent by focusing on the viability of future monopolistic
pricing (i.e., supracompetitive pricing). Id. at 1401. Even though low prices are beneficial to
consumers, their present evil lies in the specter of monopoly prices once the predation suc-
ceeds. Id. Competitors may suffer from the low price, but absent future monopoly pricing,
consumers will not. Id. Since antitrust laws protect consumers and not competitors, there
will be no antitrust injury, but rather a "gift" that actually benefits rather than harms con-
sumers. Id.
It is asserted that although Judge Easterbrook's opinion is influenced strongly by his
proposal that a price war between the plaintiff and the defendant egg producers would only
result in a consumer "windfall," such a windfall may, in this case, be illusory. Between De-
cember 1984 and November 1986, while the A.A. Poultry Farms litigants continued to do
battle, there was a 3.65% drop in the average wholesale price of shell eggs (large) delivered
in Chicago. See Commodity Research Bureau, 1987 COMMODITY YEAR BOOK 86. During this
same period, the Consumer Price Index for eggs in the Chicago area rose 6.95%. See U.S.
Dep't of Agriculture, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (1984-1987). Admittedly, there is a plethora of
possible grounds for this discrepancy, and the statistic is noted only to support the proposi-
tion that a closer examination of the actual benefit to consumers is needed to see if, in
reality, the benefit is lost by retail profit-taking.
43 See A.A. Poultry Farms, 881 F.2d at 1401-02. Judge Easterbrook worried that "[i]f
courts use the vigorous, nasty pursuit of sales as evidence of a forbidden 'intent,' they run
the risk of penalizing the motive forces of competition." Id. at 1402. This is the Chicago
School's greatest fear: that competition will be frustrated when the courts tread the fine line
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It is suggested that the schism over the relevance of intent in
attempted monopolization cases stems from conflicting views of
how federal antitrust laws are to be enforced. One jurisdiction
adopting the element of specific intent is the Eleventh Circuit, as
reflected in its decision in McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas
Co.44 In McGahee, a detailed examination of the Sherman Act's
historical framework led the court to conclude that evidence of
subjective intent is relevant to the issue of antitrust liability.45 Ad-
ditionally, Professor Areeda, who co-authored the seminal article
on pricing activities as evidence of predation,46 continues to advo-
cate the use of conduct alone as proof of intent in attempting to
encourage consistency among the circuits.47
Courts employing the Chicago School approach, on the other
hand, see the Sherman Act as authorizing the federal judiciary to
promote economic efficiency, 48 rendering evidence of predatory in-
between competitive intent and predatory intent. See Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 266-67.
Adherents to the Chicago School's approach believe that a cost-based intent analysis will
deter some legitimate and beneficial competitive actions. Id.; see also Ball Memorial Hosp.,
Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1338 (7th Cir. 1986). The Ball court stated:
Competition is a ruthless process. A firm that reduces cost and expands sales in-
jures rivals-sometimes fatally. The firm that slashes costs the most captures the
greatest sales and inflicts the greatest injury. The deeper the injury to rivals, the
greater the potential benefit. These injuries to rivals are byproducts of vigorous
competition, and the antitrust laws are not balm for rivals' wounds.
Id. But see Spivack, The Chicago School Approach to Single Firm Exercises of Monopoly
Power: A Response, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 651, 662 n.61 (1983) ("self-deterring" nature of pred-
atory conduct is no reason to allow monopolist to inflict damage "before he discovers that
his strategy has been unprofitable").
44 858 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2110 (1989).
41 See id. at 1496-1501; see also Hovenkamp & Silver-Westrick, supra note 8, at 472-73
(despite "plethora of inconsistent tests for measuring predation," one thing remains clear:
"predatory pricing has a strategic element and subjective intent is still relevant to judicial
measurement of strategic behavior").
It has been suggested that the proposed intent requirement stems from the fact that
section 2 of the Sherman act also is punishable as a felony, imbuing the civil provisions of
the statute with a criminal law principle. See id.; see also Ponsoldt, Clarifying the Attempt
to Monopolize Offense as an Alternative to Protectionist Legislation: The Conditional Rel-
evance of "Dangerous Probability of Success," 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1109, 1113, 1139-44
(1986) (discussing scope of attempted monopolization and criminal attempt doctrine).
'6 See Areeda & Turner, supra note 31 (detailing economic model of predatory pricing
activities).
47 See Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and the Fu-
ture, 75 CAL. L. REV. 959, 972-73 (1987) (actual intent still requirement for attempt to mo-
nopolize carried over from criminal law; but better to focus on conduct to achieve
consistency).
41 See R. BORK, supra note 8, at 50-89. "Economic efficiency" as referred to by Chicago
School adherents is defined by neoclassical price theory. Id. From this standpoint, the exclu-
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tent irrelevant.49 In the Seventh Circuit's A.A. Poultry Farms and
the First Circuit's Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp.50 de-
cisions, for example, the courts considered themselves free under
the economic efficiency concept to disassociate efficient from ineffi-
cient business practices as the economy grows in complexity, and
ignore predatory allegations that represented nothing more than
the whining of inefficacious losers.51
It would appear that the Chicago School's logic concerning the
misuse of "smoking gun"-type evidence of a defendant's intent is
sive object of federal antitrust legislation is to prevent the "deadweight loss" that occurs
when output is restricted to a point where price exceeds marginal cost. Id.; R. POSNER,
supra note 5, at 8-35 (1976). Such "deadweight loss" results in harm to consumers through
restricted output without an offsetting gain to producers. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for
Antitrust Offenses, 50 U. CHL L. REV. 652, 653 (1983).
" See A.A. Poultry Farms, 881 F.2d at 1402-06. "A price 'too low' for an inefficient
rival may be just right from consumers' perspective, showing only that the defendant's costs
of production are lower than those of the plaintiff-for which it should receive a reward in
the market rather than a penalty in the courthouse." Id. at 1400; see also Easterbrook,
supra note 22, at 1702-03 (efficiency theory parallels aims of consumer welfare protection).
The relevance of "efficiency" to Sherman Act analysis is itself the subject of debate. See
Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1153
(1981); Hovenkamp, supra note 22, at 284. Professor Hovenkamp maintains that the Chi-
cago School's approach is bound to be replaced eventually because "the notion that public
policymaking should be guided exclusively by a notion of efficiency based on neoclassical
market efficiency is naive." Id. The neoclassical model, in reality, does not adequately pre-
dict business activity because of the model's simplicity. See id. Hovenkamp asserts that the
trend indicates a more complex model where policymakers must rely on values outside the
model; "[t]he result is an antitrust policy that will always have a noneconomic, or political,
content." Id.; cf. Hovenkamp & Silver-Westrick, supra note 8, at 481-82 ("static economic
models can be inaccurate oversimplifications of human behavior and design"); Leff, Some
Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 452-61 (1974) (emphasizing that firms do
not always act rationally when engaging in competitive practices); Schmalensee, Another
Look at Market Power, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1789, 1789 (1982) ("a sound antitrust policy can-
not be founded on the fiction that the world is simple").
" 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983).
5, See A.A. Poultry Farms, 881 F.2d at 1402-04 (rivalry is natural component of compe-
.tition); Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 232 (" 'intent to harm' without more offers too vague a
standard in a world where executives may think no further than 'Let's get more business' ");
see also R. BORK, supra note 8, at 91 (efficiency used to measure cost and wealth in positive
analysis of business practices is also proper criterion for creating substantive rules of anti-
trust enforcement).
The efficiency school is concerned secondarily with the costs of putting an antitrust
policy into effect, including the direct and indirect costs of the legal system's administration
and enforcement of the rule. See Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 267-71 (1974). "[P]er se rules should be used when they
minimize the sum of the welfare loss from monopolization, the loss from false positives, and
the costs of administering the rule." Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 335. Litigation costs in
predation cases have been estimated to be as high as $30 million, although Judge Easter-
brook puts the figure closer to $3 million in an "ordinary case." See id. at 335 n.157.
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the most convincing argument for curtailing its use, in Sherman
Act litigation. It appears that some plaintiffs, through clever law-
yering, attempt to cajole juries into awarding treble damages under
the Sherman and Clayton Act where, in fact, there is no real anti-
trust injury.52 Tales of "dirty tricks" played by would-be monopo-
lists may fascinate juries to such an extent that the credibility of
the alleged predatory pricing scheme is ignored.53 For example, in
A.A. Poultry Farms, the plaintiff's attorneys used facially pro-com-
petitive statements of the defendant to obtain a $9.3 million jury
verdict on a predatory pricing claim-a staggering $27.9 million af-
ter trebling.5 4 Because of the possible chilling effect awards of this
magnitude may have on legitimate competition, it is suggested that
the federal courts strictly supervise the use of such evidence, and,
when instructing juries sitting in antitrust actions, establish precise
guidelines for the use of evidence of subjective intent to
monopolize. 55
52 See Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409, 1416 (7th Cir.
1989) (rejecting claim that defendant's conduct constituted predatory "intimidation"). But
see McGahee, 358 F.2d at 1504 (defendant specified wish to "contribute to [plaintiff's] fi-
nancial problems" as district goal); Henry v. Chloride, Inc., 809 F.2d 1334, 1346-48 (8th Cir.
1987) (allowing use of defendant regional manager's statements that his firm would see to it
that plaintiff's employees "all don't make it" to indicate predatory intent).
52 See Fisher, Matsushita: Myth v. Analysis in the Economics of Predation, 64 Cm.
KENT L. REv. 969, 969-70 (1988). Professor Fisher explained:
Antitrust can be a dry subject. The structural analysis that is usually required
may be of great importance, but the general public and even the legal profession
fail to find it as stirring as economists think they should....
By contrast, the analysis of conduct, of the dirty tricks played by would-be
monopolists or conspirators, has a fascination that appeals even to the palate un-
educated by exposure to serious economics. Moreover, a focus on conduct leads to
a search for "smoking gun" documents-a search that lawyers revel in and that
can produce results that juries can understand (or think they do) far better than
arguments over market definition and similar subjects....
Behind all this there is the natural human appreciation for a good story, pref-
erably with heroes and* villains. . . .Antitrust stories are surrounded by such
myths and legends, popularly believed, but often without much sound basis in fact
or economic analysis.
Id. at 969; cf. Monroe & Hill, supra note 30, at 550. "There is a respectable body of opinion
that holds that a jury cannot comprehend the legal niceties in this free-wheeling type of
atmosphere; however, a motion for a jury trial is almost always granted and it will be up to
counsel to make the case understandable." Id. (footnote omitted).
8' A.A. Poultry Farms, 881 F.2d at 1397.
See Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427, 432 (7th
Cir. 1980) (limiting use of evidence of subjective intent to monopolize); see also Areeda,
supra note 33, at 900-01 (to lessen burden of antitrust litigation on society, court should
"refuse to consider intent, unless the party relying upon it gives the tribunal reason to be-
lieve his evidence is unusually probative"); Hovenkamp & Silver-Westrick, supra note 8, at
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Merely because a claim is not appropriate under the federal
antitrust laws, however, does not mean that a company injured by
unfair business practices is without a remedy.5 6 It is submitted
that a plaintiff professing injury from predatory conduct may be
able to plead successfully a cause of action for violation of a state
"unfair competition" statute, or characterize the defendant's con-
duct as tortious and proceed accordingly.
III. STATE "UNFAIR COMPETITION" STATUTES AND TORT REMEDIES
Several state constitutions declare a policy against monopoly,57
and approximately half the states have enacted sales-below-cost
statutes of general application. Although similar in substance and
application to federal law, these statutes have withstood preemp-
tion and other constitutional challenges.59 While state predatory
447 (due to evidentiary problems inherent in subjective-intent element, theory that depends
on it will "be applied erratically at best" (quoting R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE, 189-90 (1977)).
" But see Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: 1, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 401, 402 (1965)
(all competitors may profitably employ unfair practices as means of competing or meeting
practices of other competitors).
57 W. LIFLAND, STATE ANTITRUST LAW § 2.02, at 2-6 (1990). States which have constitu-
tional proscriptions against monopoly include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. at n.1.13.
" See id. § 2.04, at 2-11 n.7 (Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming). Nearly half of these statutes apply to retailers and wholesalers
and seem to omit manufacturers from their proscriptions. Id.; see also supra note 3 (partial
listing of state statutes).
Some of these statutes are venerable. South Dakota's statute, for example, dates back
to 1902. Note, State Legislation Prohibiting Sales Below Cost, 52 HARV. L. REV. 1142, 1142
n.1 (1939).
59 See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 461 F. Supp.
410, 422-23 (N.D. Cal. 1978), afJd in part, rev'd in part, 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982) (state regulation in antitrust area not prohibited). Future pre-
emption challenges may be generated by the Supreme Court's holding in 324 Liquor Corp.
v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987), striking down a state statute forcing liquor retailers to charge
a minimum of 112% of the wholesale posted price as inconsistent with the Sherman Act. Id.
at 341-43.
In considering the constitutionality of Oklahoma sales-below-cost statutes, the Supreme
Court stated:
One of the chief aims of state laws prohibiting sales below cost was to put an end.
to 'loss- leader' selling. The selling of selected goods at a loss in order to lure
customers into the store is deemed not only a destructive means of competition; it
also plays on the gullibility of customers by leading them to expect what generally
is not true, namely, that a store which offers such an amazing bargain is full of
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pricing statutes routinely require proof of below-cost pricing as an
element of any claim thereunder, most demand the additional in-
gredient of specific intent to injure or destroy a competitor."0 State
courts have observed that these "unfair pricing laws" were enacted
to ease "the hardships of 'cut-throat' competition. 6' Some of these
courts have decided, in contrast to the current trend in the federal
courts, 2 that the presence of specific intent to injure competitors
is required for a predatory pricing statute to pass constitutional
muster. 3 Specific intent to monopolize, therefore, seems to retain a
other such bargains. Clearly there is a reasonable basis for a conclusion that selec-
tive price cuts tend to perpetuate this abuse ....
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 360 U.S. 334, 340 (1959) (footnote
omitted). In concluding that the statutes at issue were constitutional under the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Court remarked that "[c]ertainly this
Court will not interpose its own economic views... when the State has made its choice." Id.
at 341; see also William Inglis & Sons, 668 F.2d at 1048-50 (proscription by state statute of
conduct federal law permits not sufficient to warrant preemption). For discussion on the
legislative history of the Sherman Act and cases on state action immunity, see generally
Note, State Action Immunity and Preemption in Antitrust Challenges to State Pricing
Laws: Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v. Taylor Drug Stores, Inc., 71 Ky. L.J. 703, 703-
709 (1983) (no suggestion of purpose to restrain state action in Act's legislative history).
60 W. LIFLAND, supra note 57, § 2.04, at 2-11. Some of these statutes address injuring a
competitor or competition. Id. at 2-13. While competitors may be injured without injuring
competition, "injury to competition must be proved by showing substantial injury to com-
petitors as a group." Id. Pricing strategies assist the courts in establishing the existence of
an intention to injure or destroy competitors. Id. "[E]xceptions included in such statutes
generally include bona fide clearance sales, disposal of perishables and defective goods, busi-
ness liquidations, and sales which are charitable, governmental or made pursuant to court
order." Id. (emphasis omitted). Also, a meeting-competition defense is often found in these
statutes, which becomes extraneous in cases where the need to price to meet competition
renders illogical a search for predatory intent. Id. at 2-13 to -14; see also id. at 2-13 n.10
(collection of cases discussing level of competitive pricing from numerous states).
"' Burt v. Woolsulate, Inc., 106 Utah 156, 158, 146 P.2d 203, 205 (1944). The Maryland
Court of Appeals once stated that "[i]t is only when the object of price-cutting is sinister
that the sale of goods at less than cost may constitute an economic evil" subject to state
regulation. Blum v. Engelnan, 190 Md. 109, 111, 57 A.2d 421, 423 (1948) (emphasis added).
62 See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
See Twin City Candy & Tobacco Co. v. A. Weisman Co., 276 Minn. 225, 233, 149
N.W.2d 698, 702-03 (1967) (absence of intent to injure competition violates due process);
State ex. rel. English v. Ruback, 135 Neb. 335, 336, 281 N.W. 607, 609-11 (1938) (statute
overbroad for lack of requirement of intent to injure competition). However, in many juris-
dictions, including Minnesota and Nebraska, there is a statutory presumption or prima facie
showing of an illegal price for sales at prices determined outside the scope of the legislation
itself. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17,071, 17,071.5, 17,074 (Deering 1990) (presumption
of injurious intent; proof of retailer's limitation of quantity; delivery costs); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 6-2-115(1) (1989) (prima facie evidence to establish violation); IDAHO CODE § 48-
202(b) (1977) (same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:423 (West 1987) (same); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 1205(3) (1980) (prima facie evidence of intent to injure or destroy competition);
MD. Comm. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-404(b) (1990) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.08 (West
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viable and important role in this particular sphere of litigation.
The plaintiff alleging injury resulting from predatory conduct
might also seek relief under tort law principles, which seek to hold
every legally responsible party liable for damages resulting from its
conduct, provided that conduct is the proximate cause of the al-
leged injury.64 Contrary to federal antitrust law, intent has a
clearly defined role in determining the defendant's potential tort
liability."5
Dean Prosser described the role of tort law in the field of trade
rivalry as one of protecting legitimate businesses from overzealous
rivals who may engage in unfair competition practices."6 Indeed, as
demonstrated by the $8.5 billion dollar verdict in Texaco, Inc. v.
1981 & Supp. 1991) (same); NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-502 (1988) (prima facie evidence of unfair
discrimination); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13-4 (1985) (prima facie evidence of intent to injure or
destroy competition); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-205 (1990) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-5-
11 (1986) (prima facie evidence in proving costs of person, firm or corporation); VA. CODE
ANN. § 59.1-9.7(b) (1987) (prima facie evidence in proving discrimination); W. VA. CODE §
47-11A-13 (1989) (prima facie evidence of violation); 1981-82 Wis. Laws tit. 12, ch. 110.30(3)
(same).
See W. PROSSER, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 5-6 (5th ed. 1984). Tort law is directed toward the compensation of
individuals, rather than the public, for losses which they have suffered within the scope of
their legally recognized interests. Id. The law of torts is concerned with the allocation of
losses arising out of "carrying on business in competition with fellow members of that soci-
ety," among other things. Id. at 6 (emphasis added) (quoting Wright, Introduction to the
Law of Torts, 8 CAMB. L.J. 238 (1944)).
Under tort law, an injured party is awarded compensatory damages, sufficient to place
the party in the same position that he or she would have occupied had the wrong not oc-
curred. See 1 M. MINZER, DAMAGES IN TORT AcTIONS § 1.00, at 1-3 (1987). Additionally,
punitive damages may be "assessed both as an example and as a warning against particu-
larly egregious conduct, . . . serv[ing]" both punitive and deterrent functions." Cochetti v.
Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1978).
"' See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13, 18 (1979) (detailing specific intent
requirements for tort of battery).
" See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 130, at 956. (4th ed. 1971). Dean Prosser
stated:
Though trade warfare may be waged ruthlessly to the bitter end, there are
certain rules of combat which must be observed. "The trader has not a free lance.
Fight he may, but as a soldier, not as a guerrilla." In the interest of the public and
the competitors themselves, boundaries have been set by the law, and numerous
practices have been marked out as "unfair" competition, for which, in general, a
tort action will lie in favor of the injured competitor ....
Included in the list [but not exclusive of others] are defamation of the com-
petitor, disparagement of his goods and his business methods, intimidation,
harassing and annoyance of his customers or his employees, obstruction of the
means of access to his place of business, threats of groundless suits, commercial
bribery, and inducing employees to commit sabotage.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Pennzoil, Co., claims related to the tort of unfair competition can
result in devastating financial liability."' Tort claims which-resem-
ble antitrust actions include the misappropriation of a competitor's
trade secrets, customer lists, or employees.69 In addition, an in-
jured business rival may have a cause of action for tortious inter-
ference with contract.7 0 Remunerable injury may be as attenuated
as loss of the damaged party's prospective business advantage,1 if
the defendant's intentional and unjustifiable activities, including
illegal pricing plans, induced a third party to forego entering into a
prospective relation with the plaintiff or prevented the plaintiff
from acquiring or continuing a prospective relation. 2
67 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 (1988).
es See id. at 784-805 ($7.53 billion in compensatory damages and $1 billion in punitive
damages in action for tortious interference with merger contract). The judgment against
defendant Texaco resulted in its filing for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11. See
Wall St. J., Apr. 13, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
69 See Note, Antitrust Treatment of Competitive Torts: An Argument for a Rule of
Per Se Legality Under the Sherman Act, 58 Tax. L. REV. 415, 416-19 (1980). These torts
are considered pro-competitive actions, "since they quite often intensify competition, al-
though they may harm a competitor." Id. at 416. The term "competitive tort" is used often
to describe these actions. See Note, Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV.
L. REv. 888, 890-91 (1964).
70 See Lumley v. Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. 749, 752 (1853) (seminal case on tortious interfer-
ence with contract). Presently, all states but Louisiana recognize a cause of action for inten-
tional interference with contract. See Note, Interference With Contract in the Competitive
Marketplace, 15 WM. MrTCHELL L. Rav. 453, 457 n.36 (1989) (collection of intentional inter-
ferences with contract cases).
7' See Buckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal. 3d 815, 827, 537 P.2d 865, 872, 122 Cal. Rptr. 745,
752 (1975) ("prospective advantage" is relationship not yet materialized but merely foresee-
able at time of interference). To recover damages, the plaintiff need only establish "the
probability of future economic benefit." Id.
712 See H.J., Inc. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 867 F.2d 1531, 1548 (8th Cir. 1989);
Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 546-47 (7th Cir. 1986); Tom Olesker's Exciting
World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 16 Ill. App. 3d 709, 713-14, 306 N.E.2d
549, 553 (1973), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 61 M11. 2d 129, 334 N.E.2d 160 (1975); United
Wild Rice Inc. v. Nelson, 313 N.W. 628, 632-33 (Minn. 1982); O'Connor v. Shelman, 769
S.W.2d 458, 461 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
According to the Restatement '(Second) of Torts: "One who intentionally and improp-
erly interferes with another's prospective contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is
subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of
the relation .... " RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 766B (1979).
The Restatement carves out space for ferocious business practices which technically
resemble tortious interference but nevertheless are legitimate:
One who intentionally causes a third person not to enter into a prospective con-
tractual relation with another who is his competitor or not to continue an existing
contract terminable at will does not interfere improperly with the other's relation
if
(a) the relation concerns a matter involved in the competition between the
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The common law was relatively late in recognizing a cause of
action based specifically on unethical pricing strategy73 and even
today some courts refuse to do so.74 The original litigation that es-
tablished legal treatment of predatory pricing itself as an actiona-
ble restraint-of-trade offense was Tuttle v. Buck,7 5 decided by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in the early part of this century. In the
eight decades since Tuttle, courts consistently have used evidence
that the defendant's unfair pricing practices enticed customers
away from the plaintiff for the dual purposes of proving inten-
tional interference 6 and removing the defendant's behavior from
actor and the other and
(b) the actor does not employ wrongful means and
(c) his action does not create or continue an unlawful restraint of trade and
(d) his purpose is at least in part to advance his interest in competing with
the other.
Id. § 768. Conduct intended to restrain illegal competition, however, remains improper
under this section. Id. § 768 comment f.
It appears that for parties genuinely harmed by anticompetitive conduct, there is no
financial disadvantage in pursuing a tort rather that an antitrust remedy. See Kelco Dispo-
sal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc., 845 F.2d 404, 406-07 (2d Cir. 1988),
aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989) (plaintiff won on both antitrust and interference claims, but
elected tort remedy because inclusion of punitive damages inflated recovery to approxi-
mately $6 million, well beyond possible antitrust recovery). But see Fishman v. Estate of
Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 560 (7th Cir. 1986) (while plaintiff could recover compensatory dam-
ages for tort of interference with prospective advantage, punitive damages were not justified
since defendant's conduct was not beyond mere elements of cause of action).
73 See, e.g., Remington-Rand, Inc. v. Master-Craft Corp., 67 F.2d 218, 221 (6th Cir.
1933) (price cutting did not itself constitute unfair trade); Katz v. Kapper, 7 Cal. App. 2d 1,
5, 44 P.2d 1060, 1062 (1935); Potter Press v. C.W. Potter Inc., 303 Mass. 435, 494, 22 N.E.2d
68, 73 (1939) (price cutting, even though highly probable, did not as matter of law give rise
to liability); see also Rogers, Predatory Price Cutting as Unfair Trade, 27 HARV. L. REV.
139, 157-58 (1913) (commenting that "relief against injurious price-cutting would be novel"
at common law).
74 See, e.g., Seattle Rendering Works, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 104 Wash. 2d 15,
19, 701 P.2d 502, 505 (1985) (no cause of action at common law for below-cost pricing).
75 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909). In Tuttle, the plaintiff, a barber, sued for relief
against a banker who unsuccessfully sought to secure him as a tenant in one of the banker's
buildings. Id. at 145-47, 119 N.W. at 946-47. The defendant had opened a rival barber shop
in the same marketing area and engaged in price cutting so severe that the plaintiff was run
out of business. Id. In reversing the trial court's dismissal of the action, the Tuttle Court
held that the defendant's pricing activities constituted an actionable tort: "To call such
conduct competition is a perversion of terms. It is simply the application of force without
legal justification, which in its moral quality may be no better than highway robbery." Id. at
151-52, 119 N.W. at 948.
76 See, e.g., Inventive Music, Ltd. v. Cohen, 617 F.2d 29, 34 (3d Cir. 1980) (tortious
interference if buyer misrepresents facts to seller that deprives broker of commission); Sys-
tem Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 130, 133-34 (D.N.J. 1977)
(tortious interference where defendant contacted state official stating plaintiff's product was
inferior and insecure); Weitting v. McFeeters, 104 Mich. App. 188, 197, 304 N.W.2d 525,
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the protection of the rule's "safe harbors," which allow for merito-
rious business tactics."
Recently, some courts have incorporated the concept of preda-
tory pricing as an element of the tort of "unfair competition. '7 8
Although price cutting is generally regarded as a fair and welcome
part of spirited competition, if prices are cut for the principal ob-
jective of bankrupting a rival business, then such activity is consid-
ered a tortious and unfair trade practice."' Upon reexamination,
then, it appears that many predatory pricing claims inappropri-
ately filed under the Sherman Act and related federal statutes
would be actionable as either intentional interference with existing
529-30 (1981) (placing of another offer to purchase farm not per se tortious interference);
see also Raul Int'l Corp. v. Sealed Power Corp., 586 F. Supp. 349, 358 (D.N.J. 1984) (price
discrimination is both intentional and legally or ethically improper).
7 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 768. Justification is the most common affirmative
defense to an interference or unfair competition action. See, e.g., Hope Basket Co. v. Prod-
uct Advancement Corp., 187 F.2d 1008, 1014-15 (6th Cir.) (patent licensees must show justi-
fication for wrongfully inducing other manufacturers to breach licenses), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 833 (1951); Polytech, Inc. v. Utah Foam Prods., Inc., 439 So. 2d 683, 689 (Ala. 1983)
(whether defendants were justified in interfering with plaintiff's business is generally ques-
tion for jury). "Interference is unjustifiable when it is done 'for the indirect purpose of injur-
ing the plaintiff, or of benefitting the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff."' Stephen-
son v. Plastics Corp. of Am., 276 Minn. 400, 416, 150 N.W.2d 668, 680 (1967) (quoting
Johnson v. Gustafson, 201 Minn. 629, 634, 277 N.W. 252, 255 (1938)); see also Western
Fireproofing Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 896 F.2d 286, 290 (8th Cir. 1990) (licensor's allegedly
preferential pricing of products to licensee's competitor and lobbying of licensee's customers
to move their business away from licensee unjustified for purposes of claim that licensor
tortiously interfered with business expectancy under Missouri law); H.J., Inc. v. Interna-
tional Tel. & Tel. Corp., 867 F.2d 1531, 1548 (8th Cir. 1989) (predatory pricing considered
"wrongful means" of competition, intended as "illegal restraint of trade," taking defendant
out of competitor's privilege); Johnson, 201 Minn. at 634, 277 N.W. at 255 (in interference
action, malicious purpose of injuring plaintiff or benefiting defendant at plaintiff's expense
actionable if injury arises).
7' See Bartholomew County Beverage Co. v. Barco Beverage Corp., 524 N.E.2d 353, 358
(Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (tort of unfair competition includes actions for interference with con-
tract or business relation, as well as predatory price cutting); 1 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF
UNFAIR COMPETrrION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES § 4.03 (4th ed. 1981). The Bartholomew
court expanded the cause of action to include lawsuits for interference with a business rela-
tionship through predatory price cutting. See Bartholomew, 524 N.E.2d at 358-59.
7' See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1986) (be-
low-cost pricing is unfair trade practice); Cleaning & Dyeing Plant Owners Ass'n v. Sterling
Cleaners & Dyers, Inc., 285 Ill. App. 336, 351-52, 2 N.E.2d 149, 155 (1936) (price cutting
primarily to injure rival results in tort liability); Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated
woodworkers' Local Union No. 131, 165 Ind. 421, 423-26, 75 N.E. 877, 879-80 (1905) (if firm
"singly or with others, advertises his goods, undersells, solicits, and wins away the custom-
ers of his rival by false representation, intimidation or artifice, not to better himself, but to
injure his rival, he has committed an actionable wrong") (emphasis added).
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or prospective advantage, or as tortious unfair competition. 0
CONCLUSION
Antitrust cases brought under the federal statutes are among
the most expensive and protracted types of litigation known to our
system of justice.81 The Sherman Act and related legislation were
not enacted to redress intentional injury, however malicious, but
were established to protect the nation's competitive system.82 Fed-
eral courts need to maintain strict supervision over the progress of
such litigation and limit the use in jury trials of "smoking gun"-
type evidence of subjective intent to monopolize. Such evidence is
of limited relevance and tends to overshadow the significance of
other vital elements of the plaintiTs cause of action. This in-
creased vigilance may help prevent insubstantial allegations of at-
tempted monopolization from clogging the federal courts and deny
inefficient businesses from recovering treble damages and attor-
neys' fees from efficient competitors. The alternatives of state "un-
fair competition" statutes and tort law provide sufficient shields
behind which the warriors of the marketplace can protect them-
selves from their rivals' unethical tactics. Since an intentional cam-
paign of predatory pricing constitutes such unprincipled and un-
justified behavior, it is suggested that courts that have not already
done so adopt predatory pricing as an element of either intentional
interference with business relations or the tort of unfair
competition.
Michael C. Quinn
See, e.g., A.A. Poultry Farms, 881 F.2d at 1404-08 (egg producer and processer did
not engage in price discrimination in violation of Robinson-Patman Act by offering super-
market "specials"). Under the test in Bartholomew, 524 N.E.2d at 359, plaintiff Gressell
could have used the defendant's hostile statements ("We are going to run you out of the egg
business. Your days are numbered."), as evidence that Rose Acre's predatory prices were set
primarily to injure him. See A.A. Poultry Farms, 881 F.2d at 1402.
One potential problem under this analysis, beyond the general scope of this Note, is the
conflicts of laws and questions that arise when a defendant is charged with tortious unfair
competition by plaintiffs of different jurisdictions. One court faced with such a dilemma
described its task as "an unnecessary nightmare of judicial administration." American
Rockwool, Inc. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass, Corp., 640 F. Supp. 1411, 1432 (E.D.N.C.
1986). One leading commentator has suggested choosing one jurisdiction based on where
most of the alleged harm has occurred, and trying the case under the appropriate law. R.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAW § 6.30, at 342-43 (2d ed. 1980).
81 See Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 336 ("costs of litigating predation cases are stag-
gering; no more complex cases could be imagined").
"' See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
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